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Honami Ichinose - Simplified Game Theory Explanations

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The following introduction serves as a simple explanation of the relevant theoretical concepts to be used to interpret the Honami & Kiyotaka Alliance Strategy. Some of the “concepts” mentioned may look like a tangent at first. Roughly speaking, Game theory models various strategic interactions ("games") by splitting them into two different groups: one-shot (played once) and iterated (the same stage game played multiple times). One-shot versions have no prior history to condition on. However, strategies used in repeated games can take into account past plays. That's not only categorization, but it's also one of the most important distinctions. However, it is more important that both versions have equilibrium with inherently incompatible properties. Here is the typical payoff matrix for Prisoner Dilemma (PD), the almost canonical example used in Game theory. Honami’s class/Kiyotaka’s class Kiyotaka cooperates Kiyotaka defects Honami cooperates RH, Rk SH, Tk Honami defects TH, Sk PH, Pk P (both defects) > R (both cooperate) and T > S (one defect, the other cooperates) imply that the dominant strategy is to defect (for both or one player). But, as shown in the example below, it's usually more profitable when the opponent cooperates while you defect (strictly speaking, it's the mandatory condition for PD (T > R); however, since the interpretation shouldn’t solely rely on a specific game, it makes sense to use a more vague condition). Honami’s class/Kiyotaka’s class …

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